GRADES ARE NO LONGER JUST FOR STUDENTS: FORCED
RANKING, DISCRIMINATION, AND THE QUEST TO ATTAIN
A MORE COMPETENT WORKFORCE
*

Meredith L. Myers
INTRODUCTION

The Declaration of Independence states that “all men are
1
created equal.”
While persons may be inherently equal, no
individual performs equally in recital of his employment duties.
Performance variations lead most employers to adopt systems of
2
performance management that essentially “award” the achievers and
“penalize” the inefficient. Some companies implement formal
performance management systems, while others appraise employees
3
informally using loose and indistinct criteria.
Thus, there are
literally scores of “systems” in effect throughout the United States.
There is a growing trend among companies—mostly large
corporations—to engage in a method of management where
employers conduct employee performance appraisals and then use
the evaluations to rank the employees against each other from “[b]est
4
to worst.”
This performance management system is commonly
*
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1
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776).
2
See, e.g., DICK GROTE, THE COMPLETE GUIDE TO PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL ix
(1996).
3
See id. at pp. 36-80 (profiling various models of performance evaluation).
4
John Greenwald, Rank and Fire: Attrition Isn’t Working, So Best-to-Worst Grading is
Gaining—and Those on the Bottom Get the Boot, TIME, June 18, 2001, available at 2001
WL 22574432. Approximately twenty percent of companies use a formal ranking
system. Forced Rankings: Tough Love or Overkill?, HRFOCUS (Inst. of Mgmt. & Admin.,
New York, N.Y.), Feb. 2002, available at 2002 WL 5659587 [hereinafter Overkill].
Many other companies informally utilize grading in their performance management
systems. Id. Some contend that the increase in use of forced ranking is the result of
a slowing economy, which has tightened the job market and caused employers to
place more emphasis on merit based pay. Matthew Boyle, Performance Reviews: Perilous
Curves Ahead, FORTUNE, May 28, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2172786. See also Carol
Hazard, Forced Rankings in Legal Tangle: Employee Lawsuits Brewing at Capital One,
RICHMOND-TIMES DISPATCH, June 4, 2002, available at 2002 WL 7201556 [hereinafter
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5

referred to as “forced ranking.”
Many prominent companies
advocate forced ranking as an effective way to eliminate ineffective
employees and to reward superior performance, but the technique is
6
receiving substantial attention and severe criticism. Whatever the
reason for the burgeoning use of forced ranking as the preferred
system of performance management, there is no question it is a
7
growing trend that is highly criticized and is generating lawsuits.
Forced ranking is a mounting plaintiff’s target, and plaintiffs accuse it
of creating a law school type mentality, where employees sabotage
8
each other because the grading is on a curve. Lawsuits filed around
the country allege that forced ranking systems are easily abused and
that the models create discrimination on the basis of age, gender,
9
race, and citizenship.

Hazard, Lawsuits Brew]. When the economy is stagnant, the job market narrows. Id.
As a result, there is less change in employment through attrition. Greenwald, supra
note 4. Forced ranking can be a useful tool in eliminating employees staying with a
company for job security, versus employees who are looking to contribute
meaningfully. Id.
5
Forced ranking is also identified by other names, but this Comment addresses
the model solely as forced ranking. Employees are evaluated using various criteria,
and employers then use those evaluations to rank the employees from “best to worst”
or on some type of bell curve; an employee’s “rank” is often used to determine if his
job performance merits a wage/salary increase or whether it is stellar enough to
justify a promotion, or poor enough to warrant a lay-off or termination. See Reed
Abelson, Companies Turn to Grades, and Employees Go to Court, NEW YORK TIMES, Mar.
19, 2001, available at LEXIS, News; Brent M. Longnecker, Rank & Yank: The Problems
with Forced Ranking, at http://www.workforce.com/archive/feature/22/29/72/index
.php (Aug. 3, 2001) (last visited Apr. 5, 2003) (on file with author).
6
See, e.g., Abelson, supra note 5, available at LEXIS, News.
7
See, e.g., Hazard, Lawsuits Brew, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 7201556.
Critics allege that forced ranking systems grade employees by using nonobjective
criteria, and then make use of those grades to determine pay and possible
termination. Abelson, supra note 5, available at LEXIS, News. The grading system
forces employers to identify some employees as low performers. Id. Multiple lawsuits
have called the practice discriminatory, claiming that forced ranking performance
management systems have a disparate impact on certain protected classes. Id.; see
also discussion of disparate impact at Parts IV.A. and IV.B.1 of this Comment;
examples of litigation involving forced ranking models at Part II.B. Conversely, the
proponents of the system argue forced ranking raises the bar of performance and
increases the quality of a workforce. Id.; see also Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002
WL 5659587.
8
Del Jones, More Firms Cut Workers Ranked at Bottom to Make Way for Talent, USA
TODAY, May 30, 2001, available at 2001 WL 5463668. Many critics believe forced
ranking discourages teamwork. Greenwald, supra note 4, available at 2001 WL
22574432. The mentality, some argue, is that employees are afraid that if they help
each other, the person they assisted may get a better “grade” than they do. Id.
9
Jones, supra note 8, available at 2001 WL 5463668; see also discussion and
accompanying notes infra Part II.B. for examples of litigation stemming from the use
of forced ranking systems.
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Companies differ as to the precise criteria or ranking models
10
they utilize, but generally, forced ranking involves employers
evaluating employees according to certain criteria and then ranking
11
the employees against each other based on their evaluations.
12
Ultimately, the employees are given some type of “grade.”
Numerous variations of the forced ranking management system
13
exist. Generally, forced ranking involves the use of three categories
that include some manifestation of superior, average, and below
14
average/needs improvement.
Part I of this Comment explores the underlying purposes of why
companies conduct performance appraisals, the functions the
appraisals serve, and why many companies are moving toward forced
ranking as the preferred method of performance management. Part
II details various forced ranking models that corporations employ,
and concludes by assessing recent litigation addressing the use of
forced ranking management systems and the challenges those models
present. Part III scrutinizes the mixed views over the effectiveness
and ability of forced ranking to fairly evaluate employees without
creating a disparate impact on protected classes, noting both the
disdain and favor the system generates. Finally, Part IV reviews the
colorful development of the disparate impact theory, including what
is required for a plaintiff to prove a prima facie case of disparate
impact, and what defenses are available to an employer whose forced
ranking model is challenged under the disparate impact theory. This
analysis concludes that forced ranking does not, as some
commentators suggest, inherently create a disparate impact on
protected classes. Rather, disparate impact analysis must instead be
applied to forced ranking systems on a case-by-case basis, because
each model employs different criteria.
Furthermore, Part IV
postulates risk-management measures employers may undertake to
avoid or reduce the risk of costly litigation brought by employees
claiming that a company’s forced ranking performance management
system creates a disparate impact on protected classes.

10

See discussion and accompanying notes infra Part II.A.
See, e.g., Geoffrey Colvin, We Can’t All be Above Average, FORTUNE, Aug. 13, 2001,
available at 2001 WL 2173120 [hereinafter Colvin, Above Average].
12
Id.
13
See, e.g., Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587.
14
See discussion of models infra Part II.A.
11
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I. THE NEED FOR AN EVALUATIVE SYSTEM
A. General Purpose of Performance Evaluation Systems
Undoubtedly, some type of performance management system is
15
necessary to evaluate an employee’s job performance. If employees
are not consistently and uniformly evaluated, a multitude of
16
problems could result. Some of those problems include employee
confusion regarding how they are expected to perform and what they
are expected to do; those not performing may be overlooked and
their behavior left uncorrected, while those employees exemplifying
outstanding performance may not be justly rewarded causing their
17
productivity to decrease. Furthermore, if a personnel decision is
challenged, a company may not be equipped with an adequate
18
defense of its decision.
Employers must be able to terminate
employees who are not performing, and appraisal systems can be an
effective tool in rewarding and increasing efficiency and productivity,
19
while removing those individuals not satisfying company standards.
The use of performance evaluation systems has dramatically
20
increased since World War II.
In fact, performance evaluations
remain the leading source of data for decisions determining raises
21
Evaluating employees is justifiable, because
and promotions.
measurement of past behavior is a good indicator of how employees
22
are likely to perform in the future. Typically, employees who were
15

Decreased productivity by the American worker is largely the result of a
breakdown in the administration of performance appraisals. JOE BAKER, JR., CAUSES
OF FAILURE IN PERFORMANCE APPRAISAL AND SUPERVISION 7 (1988).
16
Id. at 9.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 7. Many companies view forced ranking as a tool that enables them to
better focus on the employees producing the best results. Overkill, supra note 4,
available at 2002 WL 5659587; see also RONALD B. MORGAN & JACK E. SMITH, STAFFING
THE NEW WORKPLACE: SELECTING AND PROMOTING FOR QUALITY IMPROVEMENT 252
(1996); John Edward Davidson, The Temptation of Performance Appraisal Abuse in
Employment Litigation, 81 VA. L. REV. 1605, 1607 (1995) (noting the widespread use of
performance appraisals as a method to increase both efficiency and productivity
among employees); id. at 1608 (indicating performance evaluation systems are an
effective method to attaining a more competent workforce, to identify company
needs, and to convey company objectives—the ultimate result being a more
profitable and efficient company).
20
Deborah L. Rhode, Occupational Inequality, 1988 DUKE L.J. 1207, 1228 (1988).
21
MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19; see also Davidson, supra note 19, at 1609
(noting the extensive utilization of performance appraisal systems in the United
States).
22
MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 323; See also Davidson, supra note 19, at
1609.
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exemplary workers in the past will remain so, while those who were
23
not consistently valuable are not likely to change notably.
Equally important, however, is the necessity for guidance and
24
structure so that each employee knows what is expected of him.
When employees are provided with the requisite information
regarding what type of performance is essential to succeed within
their company, it becomes easier for employers to make distinctions
25
between the employees in their labor pool.
Performance
evaluations are an invaluable tool in large corporations where poor
26
Performance
job performance may perpetuate unnoticed.
management systems that judge employees performing the same
tasks against clear, objective, and relevant criteria, result in
evaluations that serve as an effective tool in identifying both
27
exceptional and unsatisfactory employee performance. Ultimately,
refusing to acknowledge or failing to notice deficient employee
28
performance generates tension among a company’s best employees.
Eventually, the employer will experience the aftermath of ignored or
29
unnoticed low productivity and performance in its pocket.
Employment decisions that are inadequately documented may also
30
lead to costly litigation. Presently, the majority of lawsuits alleging
23

MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 323.
JACK WELCH WITH JOHN A. BYRNE, JACK: STRAIGHT FROM THE GUT 156 (2001)
[hereinafter WELCH].
25
Id. at 157.
26
Id.
27
See MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 322-27.
28
Colvin, Above Average, supra note 11, available at 2001 WL 2173120. A survey of
thousands of employees revealed fifty-nine percent of those surveyed wanted their
companies to eliminate the underperformers. Geoffrey Colvin, Make Sure You Chop
the Dead Wood: Mass Layoffs Won’t Work if You Can’t Get Rid of Weak Managers, FORTUNE,
Jan. 22, 2001, available at 2001 WL 2172249 [hereinafter Colvin, Dead Wood]. Only
seven percent of those surveyed believed their companies were eliminating
underperformers. Id.
29
A recent survey revealed that a company maintaining employees who perform
poorly creates a vicious cycle that blocks development for promising employees,
causes productivity and morale to plummet, induces promising employees to leave
the company, and ultimately results in fewer star employees being attracted to the
company. Colvin, Dead Wood, supra note 28, available at 2001 WL 2172249.
Employees surveyed who had worked for companies that failed to weed out the low
and/or underperformers, commented that the experience “prevented me from
learning, hurt my career development, prevented me from making a larger
contribution to the bottom line, made me want to leave the company.” Id. (internal
quotes omitted).
30
See ALEXANDER HAMILTON INSTITUTE, PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS: THE LATEST
LEGAL NIGHTMARE 8 (1986) [hereinafter PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS] (noting the value
of documented performance appraisals at any level of work, and citing a case where
an employer terminated an employee at his gas station after making general
24
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31

discrimination challenge an employee’s discharge.

B. Rationale Behind Forced Ranking as the Preferred Performance
Management System
Approximately one-quarter of all Fortune 500 companies utilize
32
a forced ranking performance management system. Corporations
use forced ranking to make clearer distinctions between their best
and worst employees by ensuring that management is honestly
33
evaluating them. Forced ranking compels management to identify a
34
percentage of a company’s employees as unsatisfactory performers.
Conducting employee performance appraisals is undoubtedly a
35
difficult and unpleasant task. Anxiety typically abounds for both the
employee and management at the mere mention of the need to
36
conduct a performance appraisal.
Nonetheless, performance
evaluations are one of the most essential responsibilities that
37
management must undertake. As mentioned previously, there are
many reasons why employers should utilize performance evaluations.
A well-reasoned, consistent system can produce meaningful results
that are positive to a company, because the evaluations affect future
38
company performance.
A management system that is properly
implemented and documents the justifications for an employee’s
evaluation could shield a company from litigation resulting from
39
alleged wrongful dismissal of an employee. Managers not utilizing a
company’s performance management system could be generating a
plaintiff’s litigation tool. If an employee brings an action for
criticisms of the attendant’s work, but never documented the employee’s
performance in a formal evaluation; the employee gas station attendant won his
case); see also Dare v. Mont. Petroleum Mktg. Co., 687 P.2d 1015 (Mont. 1984).
31
John J. Donahue III & Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment
Discrimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 984 (1991).
32
Some of the Fortune 500 companies utilizing a forced ranking performance
evaluation system include General Electric, Hewlett-Packard, Sun Microsystems,
Intel, and Cisco. Christine A. Amalfe & Heather A. Adelman, Forced Ranking: Latest
Plaintiffs’ Target, 10 N.J.L. 1554, Aug. 13, 2001, at 10; see also discussion of corporate
models infra Part II.A.
33
Abelson, supra note 5, available at LEXIS, News.
34
Id.
35
Max Messmer, Measuring Staff Performance, (The Metropolitan Corporate
Counsel, Inc.), Aug. 2000, at 38 (Northeast ed.).
36
Id. Employees fear being “graded,” while evaluations cause apprehension for
management who fear the potential repercussions presented by employees receiving
negative evaluations. Id.
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
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wrongful dismissal or discrimination and no documentation exists to
justify his dismissal, a court may assume the employee’s performance
40
was satisfactory.
Because management is often uncomfortable evaluating
employees’ weaknesses and informing them of those deficiencies,
41
standard performance evaluations tend to produce “false kindness.”
The end result is that if an employee is eventually laid off or fired, he
may be shocked because he received appraisals indicating his
42
performance was satisfactory. Jack Welch, former Chief Executive
Officer (“CEO”) of General Electric (“GE”), recalls a situation in his
book, where he asked a manager at GE why he gave a particular
employee a stellar appraisal when he knew the employee did not
43
deserve it. The manager’s response was that he was trying to be “a
nice guy” by protecting an employee who was not performing
44
adequately.
Unlike “traditional” performance appraisals, forced
ranking systems have the potential to make management’s job easier,
because forced ranking requires management to eliminate employees
who are not satisfying company standards, and at the same time the
45
system demands continuous improvement.
II. FORCED RANKING SYSTEMS IN PRACTICE
A. Corporate Models
Commentators suggest that GE is the innovator of the modern
46
forced ranking system. GE is a major corporation employing more
40

Messmer, supra note 35, at 38; see also Davidson, supra note 19, at 1618
(commenting that the performance evaluation “has been as effective a shield as it has
been a sword,” because poor evaluations that are well documented serve as
protection for employers against wrongful dismissal claims by providing
nondiscriminatory and legitimate reasons for an employee’s termination);
PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS, supra note 30, at 17 (noting the value of candid appraisals,
and stating that inflated evaluations may destroy an employer’s opportunity to
overcome an employee’s wrongful discharge claim).
41
See, e.g., WELCH, supra note 24, at 58.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id. Jack Welch indicates that these false appraisals came back to haunt him
when GE was forced to downsize in the 1980s. Id.; see also Davidson, supra note 19, at
1610 (noting that supervisors commonly refrain from honestly evaluating a marginal
employee because they “wish to avoid ‘playing God’ by ruining an employee’s
record”).
45
Julie Crane, Forced Ranking—The Right Way, (Fair Measures,
www.FairMeasures.com), May 15, 2001, available at http://www.fairmeasures.com/
whatsnew/articles/new237.html (last visited Apr. 5, 2003) (on file with author).
46
See, e.g., Hazard, Lawsuits Brew, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 7201556.
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than 300,000 employees and 4,000 senior managers. “[M]ore than
just touchy-feely good intentions” are needed to produce a true and
48
effective performance appraisal in such a large corporation. When
Jack Welch took over management of GE, he was shocked and
49
dismayed to find that the company was rife with underperformers.
Mr. Welch realized that the pool of underperformers in GE’s
workforce was largely a consequence of management’s unwillingness
to bear the often unpleasant task of conferring on an employee a
poor evaluation—even when a poor evaluation may be well
50
deserved. The forced ranking system Mr. Welch implemented is
51
referred to at GE as the “vitality curve.”
GE’s vitality curve requires that managers rank their employees
(management included) by the top twenty percent (“Top 20”), the
middle seventy percent (“The Vital 70”), and the bottom ten percent
52
(“The Bottom 10”). Ultimately, the distinctions are arrived at by
53
sorting out the “A,” “B,” and “C” players. Requiring managers to
“[rank] employees on a 20-70-10 grid forces managers to make tough
decisions and allows the top performers to be justifiably rewarded so
54
they stay happy and willing to grow with the company.” The forced
55
ranking promotes efficiency within the company, and GE maintains
that not removing the bottom ten percent early in their careers
47

WELCH, supra note 24, at 156.
Id.
49
Id. at 58.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 158.
52
Id. According to Mr. Welch, ranking employees continually raises the bar and
caliber of the GE workforce. WELCH, supra note 24, at 158. The result, is that the
employees at the top must continue to exhibit the qualities and performance
required to stay there, while those on the bottom are generally forced to leave. Id.
53
Id. The employees in the “A” category are passionate, committed to bringing
about results, open minded, and have room to grow. Id. The “As” “make business
productive and fun at the same time.” Id. Mr. Welch refers to these “A” category
qualities as the “four Es” of GE leadership: high energy, ability to energize others, an
edge to make tough decisions, and an ability to execute and deliver on pledges. Id.
“The Bs are the heart of the company and critical to its operational success.” WELCH,
supra note 24, at 159. The Bs, however, do not possess the same passion that the “As”
do. Id. The “C” employee fails to get the job done. Id. at 160. “C” players enervate
others and procrastinate. Id. “Cs” are not valuable enough as employees to justify
expending time on them. Id.
54
Id. Rewarding the top performers with stock options, raises, and promotions
helps GE maintain its best employees. WELCH, supra note 24, at 160. GE loses less
than one percent of its “As” per year. Id.
55
Jack Welch is quoted as saying, “A company that bets its future on its people
must remove that lower 10 percent, and keep removing it every year—always raising
the bar of performance and increasing the quality of its leadership.” Abelson, supra
note 5, available at LEXIS, News.
48
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56

would be to do them a disservice. The company regularly reassesses
57
its system based on employee feedback.
Other companies also use forced ranking systems. At least prior
to its current reorganization efforts, Enron force ranked its
58
employees biannually on a five-point scale.
Employees were
differentiated into tiers by “superior” (top five percent), in the
middle were the “excellent” (thirty percent), “strong” (thirty percent)
and “satisfactory” (twenty percent), while the “needs improvement”
59
were on the bottom (bottom fifteen percent). Employees falling in
the bottom fifteen percent were placed on probationary status and
given a period of six months to meet the requisite standard or be
60
terminated.
Microsoft Corporation (“Microsoft”) conducts performance
61
evaluations and force ranks its employees twice a year. Management
assigns each employee a scaled rating from 1.0 to 5.0 and then ranks
62
the employee among the other members in his division. Within
each work group, twenty-five percent must be rated 3.0 or below,
forty percent will be rated 3.5, and only thirty-five percent will receive
63
a rating of 4.0 or higher. Salary adjustments, stock option awards,
and promotional opportunities are offered according to the
64
Management provides employees who are
employee’s rank.
65
unhappy with their rank the opportunity to appeal.
Ford Motor Company’s (“Ford”) original forced ranking system
66
created enormous controversy.
In fact, Ford’s system was so
56

“There’s no cruelty like waiting and telling people late in their careers that
they don’t belong—just when their job options are limited and they’re putting their
children through college or paying off big mortgages.” WELCH, supra note 24, at 162.
57
Pamela Williams, The Secret Sacking Tool, AUSTRALIAN FINANCIAL REVIEW, May 4,
2002, at 21. A recent decision by GE to award employees with stock options was
based on employee feedback indicating that they felt demoralized by GE’s use of
forced ranking. Id.
58
Greenwald, supra note 4, available at 2001 WL 22574432.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Order on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification and Defendant’s Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment at 3-4, Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., No. C00-1684P
(W.D. Wash. 2001) [hereinafter Pechman Order].
62
Id. at 4.
63
Id.
64
Id.
65
Abelson, supra note 5, available at LEXIS, News.
66
Ford’s original system mandated strict quotas that required certain employees
be placed in the category of poor performance. Mark Truby, Ford Ends Grading
Quotas: Automaker to Stop Mandating the Number of Bad Reviews, DETROIT NEWS, July 10,
2001, at 1 [hereinafter Truby, Grading Quotas]. It sparked widespread dissent among
both employees and management, and led to a multitude of discrimination suits. Id.
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controversial that the company overhauled its original system and
67
instituted a new version. The original system gave employees grades
of “A,” “B,” or “C,” forcing ten percent to be graded “A,” eighty
68
percent “B,” and ten percent “C.” Managers receiving a “C” were
not eligible for bonuses or raises, and were thereafter put on notice
that another consecutive “C” rating could result in the manager’s
69
70
demotion or termination. Ford’s ultimate goal was to eliminate
deficient employees who might otherwise “fall through the cracks”
71
using traditional employee evaluations.
Ford’s revised forced
ranking system variegates employees by “top achievers,” “achievers,”
72
The new system does not
and those “needing improvement.”
73
mandate a specific percentage of employees for each category, nor
does it prevent low ranked managers from receiving a bonus or merit
74
increase.
Sun Microsystems (“Sun”) also diverged from its original forced
75
ranking system. Instead, Sun adopted a more “employee friendly”
approach that provides employees with supplemental resources to
treat the root cause of poor performance, rather than automatically
76
terminating employees falling in the bottom category. Sun’s “new
and improved” forced ranking model reduces its number of tiers
77
from five to three. The revised model characterizes employees by
the top twenty percent (“superior”), the middle seventy percent
(“Sun
Standard”),
and
the
bottom
ten
percent
78
(“underperformers”). Interestingly, this is the same breakdown as

67

Mark Truby, Jac the Knife Falls Under Ford Axe, EDMONTON SUN, Nov. 2, 2001, at
DR4 [hereinafter Truby, Jac the Knife]. Ford’s original forced ranking system was
revamped as a result of devastated morale. Id. Some argue that Ford’s original
system, implemented by former CEO Jacques A. Nasser, led to his demise. Id.
68
Truby, Grading Quotas, supra note 66, at 1.
69
Id.
70
Truby, Jac the Knife, supra note 67, at DR4.
71
Truby, Grading Quotas, supra note 66, at 1. Ford studied GE’s forced ranking
policy closely. Id. After observing the effectiveness of forced ranking at other
companies, especially GE, Ford decided to implement its own system in an attempt to
cease the shuffling around of underperformers within other divisions of the
company. Id.
72
Amalfe & Adelman, supra note 32, at 10.
73
Id.
74
Williams, supra note 57, at 21.
75
Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Greenwald, supra note 4, available at 2001 WL 22574432; see also Overkill, supra
note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587.
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GE’s “vitality curve” which commentators agree is largely successful.
At Sun, the bottom ten percent have the choice of leaving with an
80
exit package or following a plan to improve their performance, a
plan that includes one-on-one coaching to help them meet the
81
requisite standard.
B. Recent Litigation Stemming from Forced Ranking Performance
Management Systems
As mentioned previously, forced ranking is a controversial
method of performance management and is generating a firestorm
of litigation. Some major corporations (including Capital One
82
83
Financial Corporation,
Ford Motor Company,
Microsoft
84
85
86
Corporation, Conoco, Inc., and a GE subsidiary ) have had
complaints and lawsuits filed against them alleging discrimination
claims based on their use of forced ranking.
79

See supra Part II.A.
Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587. The human resources
department at Sun indicates the purpose of the new system is to divert employees’
attention away from the grade and toward improving their performance. Id.
81
Greenwald, supra note 4, available at 2001 WL 22574432. Sun CEO Scott
McNealy stated that the bottom ten percent are the employees Sun “love[s] . . . to
death.” Id. The “love” is offered by the opportunity to receive personal coaching to
meet the Sun standard, but if that “love” in not reciprocated, those employees falling
in the bottom ten percent will face their “death” in the form of a prompt exit. Id.
82
Hazard, Lawsuits Brew, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 7201556. Capital
One’s system mandates that eight to twelve percent of employees receive a grade of
“3s” (below expectations) or “3 pluses” (approaches expectations), ten to fifteen
percent receive “5 minuses” (excellent) or “5s” (outstanding), and the remaining
employees fall in between the categories. Carol Hazard, Virginia’s Capital One Said to
be Firing High Performers with Big Salaries, May 4, 2002, available at 2002 WL 21242669.
Since Capital One instituted its system in 2001, approximately one dozen complaints
alleging age discrimination have been filed against the company with the Equal
Opportunity Commission. Id. An attorney representing former Capital One
employees indicates that “[i]f the charges are not resolved at the administrative level,
we fully intend to file [a] class action suit under the Age Discrimination and
Employment Act.” Id.
83
Ford settled two class action suits alleging race and gender discrimination in
2002 for $10.5 million, as well as an individual claim for an undisclosed amount.
Mark Truby, Ford Settles Bias Suit, DETROIT NEWS, Mar. 27, 2002, available at 2002 WL
14872212 [hereinafter Ford Settles]. See also notes 87-95 and accompanying text.
84
See notes 99-124 and accompanying text.
85
The U.S. Department of Justice filed suit against Conoco, Inc., alleging the
company discriminated against United States citizens by favoring foreign workers.
Hazard, Lawsuits Brew, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 7201556. The suit was
settled in 2002 for an undisclosed amount. Id.
86
The action against the GE subsidiary is pending and alleges age and race
discrimination. Hazard, Lawsuits Brew, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 7201556.
The lawsuit seeks class action status, which was not yet granted at the time this
Comment was written. Id.
80
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Many employees filed lawsuits as a result of Ford’s first forced
ranking system, claiming it was discriminatory against older workers
87
and white males.
Ford denies that it changed the initial system
88
because it unfairly targeted white males or older employees.
Instead, Ford maintains that the initial forced ranking model was
changed as a result of complaints from management that the original
89
system produced a negative effect on morale. In response to Ford’s
denial, AARP commented that companies often use forced ranking as
90
a tactic to force out older employees. Two class action suits were
filed in Michigan as a result Ford’s original forced ranking system
91
92
adopted in January 2000. Streeter v. Ford was brought by older white
males claiming Ford’s forced ranking system had “a disparate impact
93
94
on Caucasians, males, and older workers.” Siegel v. Ford alleged
Ford’s forced ranking system was used to give older workers poor
evaluations to essentially weed them out, thereby creating a disparate
95
impact on older employees. Ford reached a settlement with these
96
plaintiffs in 2001, agreeing to pay them more than $10.5 million. In
March 2002, Ford settled another high profile lawsuit filed by former
97
human resources manager John Kovacs. Mr. Kovacs’ case alleged
reverse discrimination, claiming Ford’s ranking program unfairly
98
targeted older white males.
Former employees filed lawsuits against Microsoft alleging its
forced ranking model creates a disparate impact on African
Americans and women because it is inherently and excessively
99
subjective in nature, resulting in evaluations that are subject to bias.
87

Truby, Grading Quotas, supra note 66, at 1.
Ford Ends Quotas on Performance, United Press International, July 10, 2001,
available at LEXIS, News [hereinafter Ford Ends Quotas].
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Amalfe & Adelman, supra note 32, at 10.
92
Streeter v. Ford Motor Co., No. 01-105949-CL (Mich. Circ. Ct. Wayne Co. Feb.
21, 2001).
93
Amalfe & Adelman, supra note 32, at 10.
94
Siegel v. Ford Motor Co., No. 01-102583-CL (Mich. Circ. Ct. Wayne Co. Jan. 23,
2001).
95
Amalfe & Adelman, supra note 32, at 10. See discussion infra note 185 (noting
the current circuit split over whether disparate impact applies to ADEA claims).
96
Ford Settles, supra note 83, available at 2002 WL 14872212.
97
Id.; see also Kovacs v. Ford Motor Co., File No. 01-121039-NO (Mich. Circ. Ct.
Wayne Co. June 21, 2001).
98
See, e.g., Mark Truby, Ford Countersues in Reverse Bias Case, DETROIT NEWS, Sept.
5, 2001, available at 2001 WL 5112213.
99
Setback for Bias Suit Against Microsoft, SEATTLE TIMES, Nov. 17, 2001, available at
2001 WL 3527084. The complaint in Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., filed in the Western
88
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The lawsuits reflect dissatisfaction on the part of some minorities and
women with respect to the alleged effects of Microsoft’s ranking
100
system.
Microsoft employee Peter M. Browne, one of the
corporation’s highest ranking African American employees, filed a
101
lawsuit against the company in October of 1999. Mr. Browne’s suit
alleged race and age discrimination and cited Microsoft’s grading
system as one of the corporation’s discriminatory practices that
generates a disparate impact on African Americans and older
102
employees. Mr. Browne claimed Microsoft’s forced ranking system
required that he and other managers rate employees without the use
103
The result, according to Mr. Browne, is that
of objective criteria.
the most highly rated employees are typically those who socialize with
104
and are most like the managers. More often than not, this means
105
that those employees receiving favorable ratings and promotions
106
are white males.
On May 8, 2001, the United States District Court for the District
of Washington granted summary judgment for Microsoft on all five
107
counts of Mr. Browne’s complaint.
With respect to the disparate
impact claim, the court stated that Mr. Browne did not show that
Microsoft’s evaluation criteria creates a disparate impact on African
108
American and older workers.
The court stated that statistical
evidence is the only way to prove that Microsoft’s ranking system
109
induces a disparate impact. The plaintiff, the court posited, “failed
110
to make the requisite showing,” and Mr. Browne instead offered
District of Washington on October 4, 2000, alleged Microsoft’s rating system “permits
managers, who are predominantly white males, to rate employees based upon their
own biases rather than based upon merit.” Abelson, supra note 5, available at LEXIS,
News. Microsoft maintains that its system is both fair and helpful, gives the highest
compensation to those who deserve it, and contains its own system of checks and
balances. Id.
100
Id.
101
Browne v. Microsoft Corp., No. C99-1665C (W.D. Wash. 2000). See also
Abelson, supra note 5, available at LEXIS, News.
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Amalfe & Adelman, supra note 32, at 10.
105
Mr. Browne contended he was repeatedly passed over for promotions that were
given to younger, non-black males who were less qualified than he. Plaintiff’s Second
Amended Complaint and Demand for Jury Trial at 3, Browne v. Microsoft Corp., No.
C99-1665C (W.D. Wash. 2000).
106
Amalfe & Adelman, supra note 32, at 10.
107
See Order of the Hon. John C. Coughenour at 2, Browne v. Microsoft, No. C991665C (W.D. Wash. 2001) [hereinafter Order of Coughenour].
108
Id. at 5.
109
Id. at 4.
110
See discussion infra Part IV.A., setting forth a what a plaintiff is required to
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“bottom line evidence of racial imbalance” which the Supreme
111
Court expressly rejects as sufficient to prove disparate impact
112
exists.
In another suit brought against Microsoft filed in October 2000,
Monique Donaldson, an African American woman and former
Microsoft employee, filed a complaint on behalf of herself and all
similarly situated Microsoft employees challenging Microsoft’s
alleged pattern and practice of race and sex discrimination resulting
113
from discrimination in performance appraisals.
Specifically,
plaintiffs challenged Microsoft’s forced ranking system, calling it
“excessively subjective,” and alleged that the system is used to
generate evaluations based on the biases of managers—who are
predominantly white males—rather than on appraisals that are based
114
on employee merit.
The evaluations are the primary tool at
Microsoft for awarding compensation increases and promotion

demonstrate to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact.
111
See Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 657 (1989)
(indicating that a plaintiff does not set forth a prima facie case of disparate impact by
producing “bottom line” evidence that a racial imbalance exists in the company); see
also infra notes 155-56 and accompanying text for an explanation of “bottom line”
evidence.
112
Order of Coughenour, supra note 107, at 5. Mr. Browne filed an appeal with
the Ninth Circuit. Telephone Interview with Jerry McNaul, Esquire, McNaul Ebel
Nawrot Helgren & Vance, P.L.L.C. (Feb. 2002) [hereinafter McNaul Telephone
Interview]. The author of this Comment contacted Jerry McNaul, attorney for Mr.
Browne, to inquire as to the status of the pending appeal. According to Mr. McNaul,
Mr. Browne’s case was argued before the Ninth Circuit on July 12, 2002. See E-mail
from Jerry McNaul, Esquire, McNaul Ebel Nawrot Helgren & Vance, P.L.L.C., to
Meredith L. Myers, Comment Author (Sept. 4, 2002, 1:53 EST) (on file with author)
[hereinafter McNaul E-mail]. Mr. McNaul was unable to provide the author with any
additional information, because the Ninth Circuit entered a protective order in late
2001, cloaking the case in secrecy. Id. All records were sealed and the attorneys on
both sides were prohibited from discussing or commenting on the action. McNaul
Telephone Interview, supra note 112. When the author contacted Mr. McNaul in
late August 2002, the gag order remained in place. McNaul E-mail, supra note 112.
As of the date this Comment was written, the Ninth Circuit had not yet entered a
decision. Id.
113
Class Action Complaint at 2, Donaldson v. Microsoft Corp., No. C00-1684
(W.D. Wash. 2000) [hereinafter Donaldson Complaint]. Ms. Donaldson’s claims
rested on alleged “violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, 42 U.S.C. § 1981a, the Civil Rights Act
of 1871 and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.” Id.
114
Id. at 3; see also Amy L. Wax, Discrimination as Accident, 74 IND. L.J. 1129 (1999)
(discussing the existence of unconscious biases); Davidson, supra note 19, at 1611
(noting the existence of a subconsciously biased performance evaluation); Anne
Lawton, The Meritocracy Myth and the Illusion of Equal Employment Opportunity, 85 MINN.
L. REV. 587, 607 (2000) (stating studies reveal that race and sex influence
performance evaluations despite equal qualifications among candidates).
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115

decisions.
In an order dated November 16, 2001, United States District
Judge for the Western District of Washington, Marsha Pechman,
denied class action status to plaintiffs’ complaint and concluded that
“Microsoft’s managerial system is not inherently flawed,” but rather
appears to be “a well-crafted combination of both objective and
116
subjective measures.”
Judge Pechman reasoned that in order to
demonstrate Microsoft’s ratings system is detrimental to its
employees, plaintiffs would need to proffer evidence of disparate
117
118
impact or disparate treatment arising from Microsoft’s ranking
119
system.
Judge Pechman found that plaintiffs failed to satisfy that
120
The order explained that plaintiffs could have shown
burden.
disparate impact if they had submitted clear statistical evidence that
proved Microsoft’s performance management system created
121
significant adverse effects on women and African Americans.
115

Donaldson Complaint, supra note 113, at 3.
Pechman Order, supra note 61, at 12. The court further noted that each
employee is in a salary ladder that requires certain attributes be met in order for an
employee to move up the ladder. Id. Judge Pechman reasoned that while employees
are graded on a bell curve, the subjectivity that is inherent in such a ranking is
tempered by the advance notice employees are given as to what is required for them
to meet their job expectations, and the fact that any employee who believes he was
unfairly graded may appeal his grade. Id. at 13.
117
See discussion of disparate impact infra Part IV.A.
118
“Disparate treatment” is not being addressed in this Comment. In an effort to
better comprehend the scope and impact of the court’s decision, however, the
author will provide the reader with a working definition of disparate treatment. A
prima facie case of disparate treatment is set forth by a plaintiff who proves that
intentional discrimination took place by an employer. See McDonnell Douglas Corp.
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The basic elements of a prima facie case of
disparate treatment are: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a racial minority; (2) the
employer was seeking applicants for a job that the plaintiff applied and was qualified
for; (3) but was nonetheless rejected; and (4) after the plaintiff was rejected, the
position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants of similar
qualifications as the plaintiff. Id. Once the plaintiff proves a prima facie case of
disparate treatment, the burden shifts to the employer to proffer a legitimate and
nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff’s rejection. Id. The plaintiff is given the
opportunity to rebut the employer’s justification by demonstrating that the
employer’s offered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination. Id. at 804. See also
Christopher Dee, Disparate Impact and Subjective Employment Criteria Under Title VII, 54
U. CHI. L. REV. 957, 958 (1987).
119
Pechman Order, supra note 61, at 5.
120
According to the opinion, “broad managerial discretion in employment
practices is not itself discriminatory.” Id. Plaintiff would have to “establish a link
between Microsoft’s practices and some measurable impact on women and African
American employees” to challenge the subjectivity of Microsoft’s employment
practices. Id. at 12 (emphasis added).
121
Pechman Order, supra note 61, at 12. For a cursory discussion of disparate
treatment, see supra note 118. Cf. Jane Howard-Martin, A Critical Analysis of Judicial
116
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Instead, plaintiffs data was contradictory to their claims, and in fact
suggested that “women and African Americans received greater benefits
than their white male counterparts,” which in effect “cancelled out”
122
the data suggesting a negative effect existed.
The court granted
summary judgment for Microsoft on all but one count, which
permitted Ms. Donaldson to pursue individual disparate treatment
123
claims against Microsoft.
Plaintiffs appealed to the Ninth Circuit,
but then reached a confidential settlement with Microsoft while the
124
request for appeal was pending.
III. FORCED RANKINGS: A MIXED REACTION BY COMMENTATORS
The litigation spurred by the use of forced ranking clearly
125
demonstrates the method is highly controversial.
Like most
performance evaluation methods, forced ranking consists of both
positive and negative aspects. While there are arguments on both
sides, however, this Comment ultimately concludes that force ranking
employees is not per se illegal.
The most significant and recurring justification proffered for the
use of forced ranking is that it eliminates the tendency for
management to give employees evaluations that do not accurately
126
and honestly reflect employee performance. In the fairy tale “The
Emperor’s New Clothes,” the Emperor’s court told him he looked
127
“superb” in his new clothes. In fact, however, the Emperor was not
128
Nonetheless, the Emperor’s court told him
wearing any clothing.
Opinions in Professional Employment Discrimination Cases, 26 HOWARD L.J. 723, 729
(1983) (commenting that “[d]isparate impact is a more attractive theory than
disparate treatment for most plaintiffs[,]” because a plaintiff need not show the
alleged discrimination was intentional).
122
Pechman Order, supra note 61, at 6 (emphasis added).
123
Pechman Order, supra note 61, at 22, 24-25.
124
E-mail from Julie Goldsmith, Esquire, Cohen, Milstein, Hausfeld & Toll,
P.L.L.C., to Meredith L. Myers, Comment Author (Aug. 29, 2002, 9:36 EST) (on file
with author) [hereinafter Goldsmith E-mail].
125
See supra Part II.B.
126
Managers or supervisors often permit their company’s evaluation system to
function ineffectively to avoid open conflict. BAKER, supra note 15, at 7. Essentially,
by fearing the repercussions of giving an employee an honest evaluation, managers
are ignoring the inherent function of a performance evaluation and its potential to
improve an employee’s performance. Id. When problems with an employee are
revealed in an evaluation, but simply ignored and left uncorrected, the evaluation
becomes valueless and nothing more than a waste of time and energy. Id. Once
management and employees have noticed that the performance evaluation serves no
real purpose, they both lose faith in the method. Id.
127
MARK R. EDWARDS & ANN J. EWEN, 360º FEEDBACK: THE POWERFUL NEW MODEL
FOR EMPLOYEE ASSESSMENT & PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT 3 (1996).
128
Id.
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129

what they thought he wanted to hear.
As the Emperor well knew,
people often tell others what they want to hear rather than what they
130
need to hear. When the Emperor asked the most trusted members
of his court to anonymously reveal to him what they “really” thought of
his new clothes, the members told him the truth—that the Emperor
131
was not wearing any clothes.
Many companies favor forced ranking, because candid
evaluations tell an employee what he needs to hear, which has a direct
causal relationship to the employee’s possibility for advancement
within the company, his ability to receive promotions, raises and
132
other incentives. Forced ranking generates an “effect” by providing
employees with candor that “can overcome false self-perceptions,
133
Employees who are not
blind spots, and just plain ignorance.”
content with their rank may not perceive the “effect” as positive.
Eliminating deficient employees, however, allows a company to
operate more productively, and may even save an employee’s job if
the forced ranking makes the employee aware that he is not
134
performing at the level expected by his company.
Although some commentators find forced ranking extremely
useful, the method is also widely criticized and is often referred to as
135
“rank and yank.”
The most common criticism is that the criteria
136
used to rank employees lacks objectivity.
Critics argue the criteria
subjects the evaluations to bias and generates a disparate impact on

129

Id.
Id.
131
Id. at 3-4.
132
Many company executives advocate forced ranking as a way to compel
managers to be more honest in evaluating workers. The result is that managers
make clearer distinctions among employees, because they are forced to single out
employees not satisfying company standards. Claude Lewis, Does Worker Grading Fuel
Bias?, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Mar. 23, 2001, available at LEXIS, News.
133
EDWARDS & EWEN, supra note 127, at 4.
134
Id. at 4-5. Some proponents of forced ranking argue that the reason the
method produces severe criticism, is because it requires “changing a deeply rooted
corporate culture” where every employee was always “doing fine.” Colvin, Above
Average, supra note 11, available at 2001 WL 2173120. Former GE CEO Jack Welch is
likely the biggest advocate of forced ranking. Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002
WL 5659587. See notes 46 to 57 and accompanying text. Another corporate advocate
of forced ranking is Hewlett-Packard’s CEO Carly Fiona. Overkill, supra note 4,
available at 2002 WL 5659587. Ms. Fiona referred to Hewlett-Packard’s system as
“management the way it was originally intended to be.” Id.
135
See, e.g., Boyle, supra note 4, available at 2001 WL 2172786.
136
While criteria such as “teamwork” and “communication skills” are an integral
part of an employee’s performance, they are “fuzzy qualitative criteria” that are hard
to gauge objectively. See id.
130
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137

protected classes of employees.
Another criticism is that forced
ranking requires management to penalize an employee who is good,
but not great, when the employee is ranked against the rest of his
138
superstar team.
Many employees contend that forced ranking is
demoralizing and creates a competitive environment of intense
internal conflict, eliminating the possibility for teamwork and
139
cooperation.
IV. DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT ON STATUTORILY PROTECTED GROUPS:
THE DISPARATE IMPACT THEORY
A. Development of the Disparate Impact Theory
Employers are not precluded by law from developing criteria or
140
methods to evaluate employee job performance, and the use of
141
subjective criteria is not per se illegal.
Title VII of the Civil Rights
142
Act of 1964 (“1964 Act”), however, prohibits employers from
making distinctions among employees based on “race, color, religion,
143
sex, or national origin.”
Section 105(a) of the Civil Rights Act of
144
1991 (“1991 Act”) amended section 703 of Title VII of the 1964 Act,
further expanding the protections afforded to employees, because
the addition of subsection (k) makes disparate impact an “unlawful
145
employment practice.”
Disparate impact is a “fuzzy word” that is interpreted in varying

137

Abelson, supra note 5, available at LEXIS, News; see also Lewis, supra note 132,
available at LEXIS, News.
138
See Boyle, supra note 4, available at 2001 WL 2172786. Forced ranking critics
argue that if companies are more selective in who they hire, the result will be a
workforce full of “A” players. Longnecker, supra note 5, at
http://www.workforce.com/archive/feature/22/29/72/index.php. Consequently,
there would be no need for forced ranking. Id.
139
Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587. By force ranking more
than half of a company’s employees as average, critics argue the system encourages
“mediocre performance” and opens a “Pandora’s Box” of problems such as
infighting, bias, and litigation—which ultimately impacts a company in a negative
way. Id.
140
See Mack A. Player, Applicants, Applicants in the Hall, Who’s the Fairest of Them All?
Comparing Qualifications Under Employment Discrimination Law, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 277
(1985).
141
See, e.g., Crane, supra note 45, available at http://www.fairmeasures.com/
whatsnew/articles/new237.html; Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977
(1988).
142
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (2002).
143
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2002).
144
Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991).
145
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1) (2002).
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146

ways. The Supreme Court defined disparate impact in International
147
Brotherhood of Teamsters v. United States, stating that claims of
disparate impact involve the use of “employment practices that are
facially neutral in their treatment of different groups but that in fact
fall more harshly on one group than another and cannot be justified
148
by business necessity.”
Furthermore, a plaintiff need not prove a
discriminatory motive existed in order to prevail on a theory of
149
disparate impact.
The Supreme Court first recognized that disparate impact
liability is encompassed in Title VII of the 1964 Act in Griggs v. Duke
150
Power Co.
The Supreme Court further expanded the reach of
disparate impact liability, holding unanimously in Watson v. Fort Worth
151
Bank & Trust that disparate impact analysis could be applied to the
subjective criteria of an employer’s selection procedures “in
152
According to the Court, the “premise of the
appropriate cases.”
disparate impact approach is that some employment practices,
adopted without a deliberately discriminatory motive, may in
153
operation be functionally equivalent to intentional discrimination.”
Although confirming that disparate impact analysis may be
applied to subjective employment practices, the Supreme Court
narrowed the plaintiff’s reach substantially in Wards Cove Packing Co.

146

See Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 624 (1989); Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States,
431 U.S. 324 (1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
147
431 U.S. 324 (1977).
148
Int’l Bhd., 431 U.S. at 335 n.15.
149
Id. Cf. discussion of “disparate treatment,” supra note 118. See also HowardMartin, supra note 121.
150
401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Griggs Court acknowledged that “The Act proscribes
not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but
discriminatory in operation. The touchstone is business necessity. If an employment
practice which operates to exclude [minorities] cannot be shown to be related to job
performance, the practice is prohibited.” Id. at 431; see also CHARLES A. SULLIVAN,
MICHAEL J. ZIMMER & REBECCA HANNER WHITE, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW AND
PRACTICE 235 (3d ed. 2002) [hereinafter SULLIVAN ET AL.].
151
487 U.S. 977 (1988).
152
Id. at 991.
153
Id. at 987; see also Wax, supra note 114 (discussing the existence of two forms of
biases—the “conscious” which encompasses deliberate or purposeful animus, the
“unconscious” which is an automatic and inadvertent form of bias, and how the
unconscious bias may have a spillover effect into employee performance appraisals);
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 251 (“Immunizing subjective employment
practices from impact attack could encourage employers to abandon objective job
selection measurements in favor of subjective ones that could easily mask
discriminatory intent or that could give effect to subconscious stereotypes or
prejudices.”).
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154

v. Atonio, by holding that a plaintiff may not establish a prima facie
case of disparate impact by merely pointing to “bottom line”
155
disproportion.
Rather, “a plaintiff must demonstrate . . . a . . .
particular employment practice . . . has created the disparate impact
156
under attack.”
Congress, in response to the Wards Cove decision, codified
157
disparate impact in the 1991 Act. Essentially, Congress reversed the
Wards Cove burden of proof allocation in disparate impact cases,
provided new definition to what a plaintiff is required to demonstrate
to establish a sufficient case of disparate impact discrimination, and
rejected the Court’s definition of the business necessity defense set
158
forth in Wards Cove.
Today, in the wake of changes brought about by the 1991 Act, a
plaintiff seeking to establish a prima facie case of disparate impact
must first identify the practice challenged, and then prove that the
employer’s use of the challenged practice causes “a sufficiently
159
disparate impact on a statutorily protected group.”
This standard
can be a difficult hurdle for plaintiffs when the challenged
160
employment practice is not easily discernable.
An example of an
easily discernable employment practice would be a test identified by a
plaintiff as a barrier to the employment of minorities within a
161
particular company. The focus of disparate impact theory is “upon
the adverse effect of a particular practice or selection device on an
162
Because forced ranking systems often
appropriate labor pool.”
encompass a combination of both objective and subjective criteria, it
154

490 U.S. 642 (1989).
Id. at 657. Merely demonstrating that a racial imbalance exists in the
workforce is considered bottom line evidence of disproportion and insufficient to
satisfy the burden of demonstrating a sufficient case of disparate impact. Rosemary
Alito, Disparate Impact Discrimination Under the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 45 RUTGERS L. REV.
1011, 1015 (1993).
156
Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 657.
157
Alito, supra note 155, at 1013-14.
158
Id. at 1014.
159
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 246; see also Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason
Co., Inc., 26 F.3d 1277, 1284 (5th Cir. 1994) (rejecting a disparate impact claim
where “plaintiffs merely launched a wide-ranging attack on the cumulative effects of
[their employer’s] employment practices. The disparate impact model is not the
appropriate vehicle from which to launch such an attack.”). Demonstration by a
plaintiff that a company has an “overall lack of women or minorities in a particular
workplace or job classification” is generally insufficient to show a disparate impact
exists. SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 246. Instead, a plaintiff must specifically
identify the practice he believes is creating a disparate impact on his class. Id.
160
See id. at 246-47.
161
Id. at 247.
162
Id. at 248 (emphasis added).
155
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may prove difficult for plaintiffs to point to the precise criteria they
believe are creating the disparity.
If an employee successfully establishes a prima facie case of
disparate impact, employers may defend their policy by setting forth
their own evidence to rebut the employee’s evidence of disparate
163
impact.
While the burden is initially on the plaintiff-employee to
prove his prima facie case, if the employee makes his case, the burden
of proof and persuasion then shifts to the defendant-employer to
show that “the challenged practice is job related . . . and consistent with
164
business necessity.”
Congress left the meaning of the terms “job related” and
“business necessity” undefined, resulting in ambiguity and many
165
unanswered questions.
The only guidance Congress provides for
those seeking to define the terms “job related” and “business
166
necessity,” is in an Interpretive Memorandum referred to at Section
167
105(b) of the 1991 Act. The Interpretive Memorandum, however,
168
leaves much unresolved and does little to remedy the debate. The
Interpretive Memorandum merely directs courts to the Supreme
Court’s decisions preceding Wards Cove, including Griggs, and
indicates that the Interpretive Memorandum is the sole source of
169
legislative history to be relied on when interpreting the terms. The
result is continued uncertainty, because the Court’s decisions

163

See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2002); see also Alito, supra note 155, at
1016-17; SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 280-83; Kay H. Hodge, The Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, SG060 ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY 337, 346-47 (Mar.
2002).
164
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i) (2002) (emphasis added); see also Alito, supra
note 155, at 1021; Jack M. Beermann, The Unhappy History of Civil Rights Legislation,
Fifty Years Later, 34 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1026 (2002); Daniel M. Tardiff, Knocking on the
Door: Finally an Answer from Within for Employment Testers, 32 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 909, 92324 (2001).
165
See, e.g., Alito, supra note 155, at 1021-40. See also Tardiff, supra note 164, at
n.120 (discussing that due to the 1991 Act’s vagueness in defining the terms
“business necessity” and “job related,” there is potential for a conservative federal
bench to define the terms along the lines of the Supreme Court’s Wards Cove
decision).
166
The Interpretive Memorandum may be found at 137 CONG. REC. S15,276
(daily ed. Oct. 25, 1991).
167
Pub.L. No. 102-166, 105(b) Stat. 1071 (1991); see, e.g., Alito, supra note 155, at
1018-19; Christine Jolls, Antidiscrimination and Accommodation, 115 HARV. L. REV. 642,
666 (2001).
168
See Michael Carvin, Disparate Impact Claims Under the New Title VII, 68 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1153, 1160-61 (1993) (stating Congress “punted” by failing to give
meaning to what the terms business necessity and job related mean, and by failing to
resolve the debate).
169
See, e.g., Alito, supra note 155, at 1018-19; Jolls, supra note 167, at 666.
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involving the terms’ definitions have been anything but uniform.
Relying on the decisions preceding Wards Cove, as Congress
171
requires in its Interpretive Memorandum, if a defendant-employer
cannot demonstrate that an exclusionary or discriminatory practice is
172
related to job performance and is a reasonable measure of job
173
174
performance, the practice will be prohibited. Under Griggs, if an
employer’s proffered justification for the use of the challenged
practice is to upgrade its labor pool, a court must find the rationale
insufficient to establish that the discriminatory practice is “job
175
related” or a “business necessity.”
More often than not, empirical
data is preferred to corroborate a precise connection between the
176
challenged practice and the employer’s justification for it. In some
cases, the Supreme Court requires employers to justify their defenses
177
with empirical data. At other times, however, the Court states that
such “validation criteria” are not explicitly required, because some
qualities such as ambition, loyalty, and common sense cannot be
178
measured quantitatively through validation criteria. “While Griggs .
. . [and] Dothard . . . adopted a strict approach . . . Watson reflect[ed]
a more lenient view of the job relatedness and business necessity
179
defense.”
Congress, however, appears to align with the Griggs
model through its express reference to the case in its Interpretive
180
Memorandum.
If the defendant-employer sufficiently rebuts
plaintiff’s prima facie case by proving that its performance evaluation
system is job related and a business necessity, the plaintiff may still
181
182
prevail if he can show that an “alternative employment practice”
170

SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 286; see also Susan S. Grover, The Business
Necessity Defense in Disparate Impact Discrimination Cases, 30 GA. L. REV. 387, 393 (1996)
(indicating that the Court’s prior decisions were not consistent with each other,
requiring that the interpretation of “business necessity” and “job related” rely on
policy and theoretical underpinnings).
171
See supra note 166.
172
See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
173
See id. at 436.
174
See id. at 431.
175
401 U.S. 424 (1974).
176
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 286.
177
See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 (1977) (rejecting defendantemployer’s justification for the challenged practice, because the defendant-employer
failed to provide empirical data to support its argument).
178
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 991 (1988).
179
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 289.
180
Id. Conversely, Congress made no mention of the more lenient approach set
forth in Wards Cove. Id.
181
This surrebuttal offered to plaintiffs is not withstanding a threshold showing of
disparate impact. It is still required that plaintiff prove a prima facie case of disparate
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exists that would produce the same effect as the challenged practice
183
and the employer refuses to adopt it.
The history of disparate impact since Griggs and Watson remains
184
complicated and confusing to apply. In fact, courts still engage in
debate while trying to discern the scope of the theory of disparate
185
impact.

impact in conjunction with the fact that an alternative employment practice exists.
See Bryant v. City of Chi., 200 F.3d 1092, 1094 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating that if the
defendant-employer rebuts plaintiff’s initial prima facie case, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff for another opportunity to present her case by proving an alternative
existed to the challenged practice that would serve the same purpose); Price v. City
of Chi., 251 F.3d 656, 659 (7th Cir. 2001) (rejecting plaintiff’s claim that an
alternative would have a lesser impact on African Americans because plaintiff did not
sufficiently prove that the present method the employer was using created an adverse
impact); see also Susan Marie Connor & Tom H. Luetkemeyer, Employment
Discrimination and Discharge, ILLINOIS ICLE HANDBOOK ON EMPLOYMENT TERMINATION
2, 2.51 (Apr. 2002); Hodge, supra note 163, at 346-47.
182
The meaning of “alternative employment practice” is not easily discernable.
See Michael J. Zimmer, Individual Disparate Impact Law: On the Plain Meaning of the
1991 Civil Rights Act, 30 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 473, 484-503 (for a thorough discussion of
the definition of “alternative employment practice”). For purposes of this Comment,
the author uses the meaning set forth by the Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975) (indicating that alternative employment practices
include “other tests or selection devices, without a similarly undesirable racial effect,
[that] would also serve the employer’s legitimate interest . . . .”).
183
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(ii) (2002). However, plaintiff is required to
prove that the alternative employment practice “would be equally as effective as the
challenged practice in serving the employer’s legitimate business goals.” Wards Cove,
490 U.S. at 661 (citing Watson, 487 U.S. at 998). The Wards Cove Court recognized
that courts should be cautious in mandating that an employer adopt a plaintiff’s
alternative business practice, because courts are less qualified than employers to
reform a business practice. Id. at 661.
184
See Zimmer, supra note 182, at 473-74 (noting Congress’ choice to leave the
definitions of business necessity and job relatedness open to interpretation based on
the Court’s decisions preceding Wards Cove has “raise[d] as many questions as it
[has] answered”).
185
SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note 150, at 243. While the issue of disparate impact
theory has been squarely addressed and found to encompass Title VII actions, there
is currently a circuit split on the issue of whether the theory applies to the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA). See Lyon v. Ohio Educ. Ass’n & Prof.
Staff Union, 53 F.3d 135, 138 (6th Cir. 1995) (disparate impact theory not available
under ADEA); see also EEOC v. Francis W. Parker Sch., 41 F.3d 1073, 1078 (7th Cir.
1994) (disparate impact theory not available under ADEA); Frank v. United Airlines,
216 F.3d 845 (9th Cir. 2000) (disparate impact theory is available under ADEA); Ellis
v. United Airlines 73 F.3d 999, 1001 (10th Cir. 1996) (disparate impact theory is not
available under ADEA). The Court has determined that disparate impact does not
apply to discrimination claims arising under section 1981. Gen. Bldg. Contractors
Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 389 (1982); see also SULLIVAN ET AL., supra note
150, at 245 (noting circuit split over the application of the disparate impact theory to
ADEA claims).
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B. Application of Disparate Impact Theory to the Forced Ranking
Method of Performance Evaluation
1. Disparate Impact: Is it too early to know?
It would be impossible to determine, and careless to state, that
forced ranking performance management systems by nature create a
186
disparate impact on statutorily protected classes. While critics may,
in fact, make valid and notable comments, their criticisms are public
policy/management arguments and not legal arguments. Forced
187
ranking is legal,
as is using subjective criteria to conduct
188
performance evaluations.
Rather, it is when employers blatantly
ignore or fail to recognize that a particular facet of their forced
ranking model is creating, or has the potential to create, a disparate
impact on statutorily protected groups that they encounter
189
problems. In essence, it is an employer’s “failure to cover its bases”
190
The law sets forth precisely
that generates potential dilemmas.
191
what is required for a plaintiff to prove disparate impact.
Consequently, employers should be prepared to combat potential
litigation through judicious risk-management.
There is no study proving that forced ranking inherently
produces a disparate impact. As discussed in Part III, virtually every
case filed challenging a company’s forced ranking model has been
settled, granted summary judgment, or is presently on appeal—with
192
the most recent appeals
being cloaked in confidentiality.
186

Despite requests to squarely address the alleged disparate impact of forced
ranking systems, the Supreme Court has not yet entertained this request. At least for
now, determining whether forced ranking creates a disparate impact on protected
classes must involve a case-by-case analysis. Each company’s forced ranking system is
unique, which will require each plaintiff challenging the effects of a particular system
to proffer statistical evidence. As the Court held in Wards Cove, “bottom line”
statistics are insufficient. See supra notes 154-56 and accompanying text. Instead, a
plaintiff must provide statistical evidence that establishes a substantial disparity exists.
See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank & Trust, 487 U.S. 977, 994-95 (1988).
187
See, e.g., Crane, supra note 45, available at http://www.fairmeasures.com/
whatsnew/articles/new237.html.
188
See, e.g., Watson, 487 U.S. 977.
189
See, e.g., Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971) (stating that
practices or procedures that maintain prior discriminatory effects are illegal—even if
they appear neutral on their face).
190
This Comment argues a company can insulate itself from losing in litigation by
taking certain risk-management measures. See discussion infra Part IV.B.2.
191
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
192
The appeal filed by Peter M. Browne against Microsoft Corporation is
shrouded by a protective order. McNaul Telephone Interview, supra note 112. All
records are under seal and the attorneys have been ordered not to speak about the
case. Id.
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Nonetheless, employers should not sit idly by dawdling under the
umbrella of status quo. It would be foolish for employers to ignore
the rise in litigation resulting from the use of forced ranking.
Employers can look to the law regarding disparate impact to
determine how courts will evaluate whether or not their performance
193
evaluation systems cause a disparate impact, and it would be
prudent for companies to utilize the framework provided by the case
law and statutes to ensure that their forced ranking model is in
compliance with the framework provided by the Supreme Court and
Congress.
2. Risk-Management Measures
Some litigation is an inevitable result and costly aspect of
194
employment decisions.
Fortunately, safeguards are available to
employers—the choice is ultimately theirs as to whether they choose
to utilize those safeguards. One of the most powerful protections
available to employers is the “virtual roadmap” of protection afforded
by a close examination of the current state of anti-discrimination law.
The virtual roadmap for analyzing the legality of a company’s forced
195
ranking system is a disparate impact analysis.
While there are no
failsafe protections, this Comment proposes that an employer can
utilize knowledge afforded by the law prophylactically. Consider why
motorists wear safety belts. Safety belts are prophylactic measures.
Wearing a safety belt in an automobile does not prevent an accident,
nor is it a guarantee that a motorist who wears a safety belt will not be
injured if involved in an accident. Nonetheless, studies reveal that
safety belts are highly effective tools that, when worn properly, reduce
196
a motorist’s chance of morbidity and mortality.
Similarly,
companies utilizing protective measures before employment
193

See discussion supra Part IV.A.
See Lauren M. Hollender & Martha L. Lester, Termination Guidelines; How
Employers Can Reduce the Risk of Litigation During Downsizing, 9 EMPLOYMENT LAW
STRATEGIST 1, 1 (Dec. 2001) (noting that poorly planned employment decisions may
require a company to defend itself against costly litigation; while no employment
decision is without risk, steps may be taken by companies employer to minimize the
risks of employment decisions); Elizabeth Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs in
High Places, 95 HARV. L. REV. 945, 954 (1982) (observing the pressure that is placed
on employers to avoid litigation costs by adopting performance evaluation systems
that have no adverse impact on protected classes at the outset); Davidson, supra note
19, at 1615 (commenting on the enormous “financial, psychological and reputational
costs” employment litigation places on employers).
195
See discussion supra Part IV.A.
196
See, e.g., Benefits of Safety Belts and Motorcycle Helmets: Report to Congress 1996, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION,
at i (on file with author).
194
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litigation arises may not completely avoid litigation, but may be able
to mitigate its impact.
The purpose of this Comment is not to propose that an
197
alternative employment practice exists.
Nor does this Comment
make a blanket suggestion that utilizing forced ranking systemically
198
creates a disparate impact on statutorily protected groups.
As
199
discussed previously, it does not.
Rather, this Comment suggests
that a number of risk-management measures exist that employers
may implement or follow to protect themselves from the potential for
200
litigation this employment practice appears to have.
It would be prudent for a company to conduct statistical studies
to ensure its forced ranking model is not generating a disparate
impact on protected classes that is not otherwise justified by a valid
business necessity defense, and that no alternative employment
practice exists that would accomplish the same goal its forced ranking
201
model seeks to effectuate.
To do this, a company must first
202
question why it is choosing to utilize forced ranking. The company
must be prepared to prove that the goal it seeks to achieve is critical
to the company’s success, and that the employment practice is vital to
203
achieve the company’s goals. If the company can demonstrate that
the rationale underlying its choice to use a forced ranking system is
to solve an internal problem or to add value to the company or its
204
workforce, it has likely articulated a strong argument.
In addition to performing empirical studies, employers should
be thoughtful when formulating the criteria for employees’
evaluations and when creating the format for the forced ranking
model—always mindful of the “disparate impact virtual roadmap.”
197

See supra notes 181-83 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 186-87 and accompanying text.
199
See supra notes 186-91 and accompanying text.
200
See Crane, supra note 45, available at http://www.fairmeasures.com/
whatsnew/articles/new237.html; Employee Evaluations—Does Your Company Earn an
‘A’?, 10 CALIFORNIA EMPLOYMENT LAW LETTER 4 (Mar. 5, 2001) [hereinafter Employee
Evaluations]; see also Hollender & Lester, supra note 194, at 3-5.
201
See Hollender & Lester, supra note 194, at 3-5 (noting the necessity that
employers conduct statistical analysis to ensure their employment practices do not
generate a disproportionate adverse impact on protected classes); see also discussion
Part IV.A.
202
See, e.g., Hollender & Lester, supra note 194, at 3-5.
203
Grover, supra note 170, at 429-30; see also MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at
326. Cf. Len Biernat, Subjective Criteria in Faculty Employment Decisions Under Title VII: A
Camouflage for Discrimination and Sexual Harassment, 20 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 501, 516
(1986-1987) (observing courts’ reluctance to get involved in business decisions due
to their lack of expertise).
204
See id.
198
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Forced ranking systems are legal so long as employers execute them
205
properly. Employees should be provided with advance notice of the
206
new policy, and given clearly articulated objectives and measurable
207
The model formulated needs to deepen the
expectations.
employee’s understanding of his performance so that he may work
208
on areas in which he may be weak.
Once the forced ranking system is successfully implemented,
employers should continue practicing certain risk-management
measures. Companies must comply with any reforms to Title VII that
209
would affect them.
Furthermore, supervisors or managers
210
conducting appraisals must be properly trained and given specific
written instructions with unambiguous guidelines on the purpose of
the employee’s evaluation, the manner in which it will be used, the
process for completing the evaluation, warnings regarding certain
211
biases, and clear-cut criteria on which supervisors are to base their
212
judgments.
Supervisors must be instructed to carefully document
213
justifications for the given judgment on each criterion, citing
214
specific examples where possible. If practicable, employers should
try to combine information from various sources and allow more than

205

Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587.
See id.; Hollender & Lester, supra note 194, at 2 (observing the importance
from a risk-management perspective of giving employees advance notice of
employment decisions).
207
See Employee Evaluations, supra note 200; Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002
WL 5659587; MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 326.
208
Bruce Pfau et al., Does 360-Degree Feedback Negatively Affect Company Performance?,
HRMAGAZINE (June 1, 2002), available at 2002 WL 7664616.
209
Biernat, supra note 203, at 543.
210
See PERFORMANCE APPRAISALS, supra note 30, at 50 (discussing a study where
evaluations given by supervisors who received a training course on how to conduct
effective evaluations, solicited the most positive responses from the employees
evaluated); MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 326 (in addition to written
instructions, supervisors or managers performing employee evaluations should be
trained in how to reduce rating contamination, and how to discuss with an employee
his evaluation); Employee Evaluations, supra note 200.
211
The criteria used to evaluate employees should be rationally related to
company goals and values. See Messmer, supra note 35; see also discussion supra Part
III.A.
212
MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 326.
213
See Player, supra note 140, at 300 (remarking that when an employee’s
evaluation reflects poor job performance, the employer should cite specific examples
regarding why that determination was reached).
214
See Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587 (commenting that to
assist a company in avoiding claims of bias in evaluations, it is important for
employers to provide concrete examples in an employee’s evaluation of what is
deemed good and bad performance).
206
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215

one person to evaluate an employee. Equally important, however,
is the need to articulate to employees the goals and functions the
216
ranking system seeks to serve.
Implementing such a practice
develops a system of checks and balances on the forced ranking
217
A
system—which may ultimately guard against unconscious bias.
copy of the evaluation should be provided to the employee and be
218
signed by both the employee and the person who evaluated him.
The employee should receive an opportunity to discuss his
219
performance evaluation and subsequent ranking with his employer,
and be afforded the opportunity to challenge his ranking through an
220
internal dispute system.
Companies must also ensure that the evaluations used to force
221
rank their employees are taken seriously and are utilized and
222
conducted consistently.
This may include evaluating managers on
223
their ability to conduct fair evaluations that satisfy company goals.
Periodic monitoring of the forced ranking management system
should take place to maintain the reliability and integrity of the
system, and to evaluate whether it is still sufficiently satisfying
224
corporate goals. Moreover, in an attempt to guard against bias and
discrimination, employers may want to consider implementing
diversity awareness training for managers conducting performance
225
evaluations.
CONCLUSION
This Comment explored the controversial performance
management system referred to as forced ranking. Forced ranking is
strongly advocated by employers who seek to compel managers to
215

Biernat, supra note 203, at 545 (observing that fair personnel decisions are
more likely to result when an employer uses information from a variety of sources,
and that utilizing such a system has the potential to reduce discrimination).
216
See, e.g., Pfau et al., supra note 208, available at 2002 WL 7664616.
217
Id.; see also Wax, supra note 114 (setting forth what unconscious bias is).
218
Davidson, supra note 19, at 1628 (observing that requiring both parties to sign
an evaluation and then giving the employee a copy of the appraisal puts an employee
on notice that his performance is well documented).
219
MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 326.
220
See Overkill, supra note 4, available at 2002 WL 5659587.
221
Employee Evaluations, supra note 200.
222
See BAKER, supra note 15, at 7 (noting that one of the inherent problems with
performance appraisals is the failure of employers to utilize the evaluations,
consequently permitting their performance management systems to function
ineffectively).
223
Employee Evaluations, supra note 200.
224
MORGAN & SMITH, supra note 19, at 327.
225
Wax, supra note 114, at 1184-85.
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provide employees with candid feedback. Traditional performance
evaluations consistently permit underperformers to maintain their
status within a company, because managers fear the potential
227
repercussions from employees who receive negative evaluations.
The end result is a company rife with underperformers, and whose
ultimate productivity and profit suffer. Forcing managers to rank
employees against each other requires managers to take an honest
look at their workforce, while allowing them to eliminate employees
not satisfying company standards.
The battle cry of plaintiffs opposed to forced ranking systems is
that they create a disparate impact on protected classes of persons.
This Comment summarized what is required for a plaintiff to prove a
prima facie case of disparate impact, discussed the defenses available
to defendant-employers, and ultimately concludes that because
statistical data is required to prove disparate impact, it would be
imprudent to attach a systemic accusation of disparate impact on
forced ranking. Instead, each challenged forced ranking system will
likely require a case-by-case analysis. By engaging in carefully
planned risk-management measures, however, employers can greatly
reduce, if not eliminate, their chances of losing in litigation
challenging their forced ranking performance management systems.

226
227

See discussion supra Part III.A.
See id.

